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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states (with ‘very high 
confidence’) that, ‘Climate change currently contributes to the global burden of 
disease and premature deaths’ (Confalonieri et al. 2007a, p. 393).2  In the future, 
climate change is predicted to cause increased deaths, injuries, malnutrition, water-
stress and illness.  There is, for example, ‘high confidence’ that climate change will 
‘increase the number of people suffering from death, disease and injury from 
heatwaves, floods, storms, fires and droughts’ (Confalonieri et al. 2007a, p. 393).  
Climate change is also expected to ‘increase malnutrition and consequent disorders, 
including those related to child growth and development’ (Confalonieri et al. 2007a, 
p. 393).  The IPCC predicts that: 
 
By 2020, between 75 million and 250 million people [in Africa] are projected 
to be exposed to increased water stress due to climate change (IPCC 2007b, p. 
13). 
 
In short, climate change poses a serious threat to some of our most basic human 
interests.   
 
The IPCC is also confident about the causes of climate change: 
 
Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-
20
th
 century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG 
[greenhouse gas] concentrations (IPCC 2007a: 39; original emphasis). 
 
The IPCC defines an outcome that is ‘very likely’ as one that has an ‘assessed 
probability of occurrence’ of more than 90% (IPCC 2007a: 27).  There is greater than 
90% probability that humans have caused global climate change.  In other words, 
human actions that involve the emission of greenhouse gases threaten basic human 
interests. 
 
This has led some activists and philosophers to argue that we should conceive of 
climate change as a human rights issue: we violate human rights by emitting 
greenhouse gases.  This contrasts sharply with the dominant cost-benefit analysis 
approach to assessing how we should respond to climate change, which is used by 
economists.  On the human rights approach, we do not try to calculate the economic 
costs of death, injury, malnutrition, water-stress or illness and then weigh them 
against the opportunity costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
3
  Instead, we 
recognise human rights to life, physical security, subsistence and health that should be 
protected from violation by human action.  If anthropogenic climate change threatens 
to violate these basic rights, each one of us has (at least) a duty to pay his or her fair 
share of the costs of preventing anthropogenic climate change.  Moreover, our climate 
policy will have a very different goal: protecting human rights rather than maximising 
welfare. 
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In this paper, I defend the claim that anthropogenic climate change violates the human 
rights to life, physical security, subsistence and health.
4
  I will call these ‘basic 
rights’.5  The exploration of the nature and scope of basic human rights is an 
important aspect of liberal political theory.  Moreover, the development of liberal 
political theory in the twenty-first century depends on investigating how it can 
accommodate major new challenges, including climate change.  The basic rights 
approach is best understood as a minimalist cosmopolitan liberalism.  Liberal 
cosmopolitans recognise rights and duties that extend beyond state borders.  A basic 
rights approach (probably) offers the least demanding account of those rights and 
duties.  Therefore, most liberals should be concerned that anthropogenic climate 
change violates basic human rights and should recognise correlative duties. 
 
The paper is divided into six main sections with a conclusion.  In section one, I review 
the use of human rights language in philosophical discussions of climate change.  In 
section two, I outline the most common kind of defence of human rights in 
contemporary political philosophy – namely, an ‘important interests’ argument – and I 
suggest that this kind of defence for the basic rights is largely uncontroversial (unless 
we reject the very idea of human rights).  In sections three to six, I consider four 
objections to the claim that anthropogenic climate change violates basic rights.  
Section three considers the claim that future persons cannot have (basic) rights.  
Section four considers the objection that rather than violating basic rights, 
anthropogenic climate change only poses a risk to them.  Section five considers the 
claim that no individual person violates basic rights by emitting greenhouse gases 
because anthropogenic climate change is the cumulative outcome of the actions of 
many millions of people.  Section six considers the argument that protecting basic 
rights from the effects of anthropogenic climate change would impose unbearable 
burdens on current persons.  In responding to these objections, I will defend a 
distinctive interpretation of human rights and, in particular, an account of the climate-
related duties that are correlative to basic rights.  
 
 
1. Which human rights are violated by anthropogenic climate change? 
 
The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has 
highlighted the impact of climate change on human rights: 
 
Global warming could result in hundreds of millions of people suffering from 
hunger, malnutrition, water shortages, floods, droughts, heat stress, diseases 
triggered by extreme weather events, loss of livelihood, and permanent 
displacement.  Indeed, climate change poses a direct threat to a wide range of 
universally recognized fundamental rights, such as the rights to life, food, 
adequate housing, health and water (United Nations 2007). 
 
The suggestion is that climate change is a ‘direct threat’ to some of the most basic 
human rights.  Similar arguments have been made by political philosophers writing on 
climate change.   
 
Henry Shue has argued that there is a human right to ‘physical security’ and that this 
right is threatened by anthropogenic climate change (1999, p. 39): 
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The not-so-unlikely threats to the physical security of people in the not-so-
distant future from fossil fuel consumption by people in the present include: 
 the migration away from the equator toward both poles of semi tropical 
habitats suitable for mosquitoes and consequently of the mosquito-borne 
diseases that currently wreak havoc in the tropics; 
 the infiltration by salt-water of the fresh ground water supplies of gigantic 
population centres like Shanghai … 
 and much else (Shue 1999, p. 50). 
 
Simon Caney has identified several human rights that are threatened by climate 
change, including the right to life, the right to health, and the right to subsistence 
(Caney 2009a; Caney 2009b).  He has also suggested that: 
 
It is arguable that climate change jeopardizes a human right to development … 
Furthermore, one might argue that there is a human right not to be forcibly 
evicted … and that climate change violates this because people from coastal 
settlements and small island states will be forced to leave (Caney 2009a, p. 
12). 
 
Caney has also argued, in other papers, that there is a human right ‘not to be exposed 
to dangerous climate change’ (Caney 2008, p. 539; Caney 2006, p. 263).   
 
A similar climate-specific human right has been defended by Steve Vanderheiden, 
who suggests that: 
 
Since rights exist in order to protect interests, a strong case can be made from 
the critical importance to human welfare of climatic stability for a right to an 
adequate environment with the corollary that the right includes a claim to 
climatic stability (Vanderheiden 2008, p. 252). 
 
Vanderheiden builds on Tim Hayward’s argument for a human ‘right to an 
environment adequate for (human) health and well-being’ (Hayward 2005, p. 29).  
More recently, Hayward has also defended a human right to a fair share of ‘ecological 
space’: 
 
[Climate] justice, like global justice more generally, and indeed as a part of it, 
implies a fundamental right of each individual to an equitable share of the 
planet’s aggregate natural resources and environmental services that are 
available on a sustainable basis for human use (Hayward 2007, p. 445). 
 
Hayward’s account suggests that the victims of climate change – as well as the poor 
more generally – have their human right to a fair share of the ‘planet’s aggregate 
natural resources and environmental services’ violated by the actions of those in the 
developed world who use more than their fair share of natural resources and 
environmental services, including the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere. 
 
In summary, political philosophers have argued that climate change violates a range 
of human rights.  Some of these accounts have appealed to widely recognized human 
rights, including the rights to life, physical security, health and subsistence.  Other 
accounts have defended ‘new’ climate-specific or environmental human rights.  In 
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this paper, I will focus on arguments that anthropogenic climate change violates 
widely recognized – or basic – human rights.  If anthropogenic climate change 
violates basic rights, we may not need to defend more controversial – or more 
ambitious – human rights claims to justify urgent action on climate change.6 
 
 
2. How should we defend human rights? 
 
The most straightforward way of defending any particular human right is to show that 
it has already been included in international human rights conventions. One attraction 
of this approach is that rights that have been widely recognized in international law 
may be less controversial than rights that have not been recognized in international 
law.  Moreover, if we begin from legally recognized human rights, we may be able to 
avoid offering moral arguments to support our fundamental rights commitments.  
Basic rights to life, physical security, health and subsistence can be readily defended 
in this way by appealing to major human rights documents, such as the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
7
 
 
However, the ‘legal’ approach to defending human rights is only a shortcut for most 
moral and political philosophers.  The legal recognition of a human right is ultimately 
justified by a moral argument for that human right.  Many different kinds of moral 
arguments have been offered for particular human rights.
8
  However, basic rights – 
including the rights to life, physical security, subsistence and health – are often 
defended by appealing to the interests that they protect: 
 
Virtually any argument in favor of a right will depend at bottom on 
emphasizing that the interest to which the right is asserted is genuinely 
important, fundamental, vital, indispensable, etc. (Shue 1980, p. 8).  
 
On this account, our most important human interests provide the grounds for basic 
human rights.  We have seen that human rights provide the strongest (moral) 
protection that we can offer, therefore, they must be connected to our most important 
interests.  As Griffin argues, in defence of his own account of human rights: 
 
I choose those features [autonomy and liberty among others] precisely because 
they are important human interests.  It is only because they are especially 
important interests that rights can be derived from them; rights are strong 
protections, and so require something especially valuable to attract protection 
(Griffin 2008, p. 35). 
 
Similarly, ‘especially important’ human interests in life, physical security, subsistence 
and health might reasonably be taken as grounds for basic human rights to life, 
physical security, subsistence and health.
9
   
 
The ‘important human interests’ argument provides a relatively straightforward way 
of defending particular human rights.  If we accept the argument for basic rights to 
life, physical security, subsistence and health, from here it seems a relatively 
straightforward step to the claim that anthropogenic climate change violates – or 
threatens to violate – these human rights.  Caney has claimed that ‘it is clear that 
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anthropogenic climate change violates [the right to life]’ by, for example, increasing 
the frequency of extreme weather events, including storm surges, which can be 
expected – based on previous experience – to cause ‘very high mortality’ among the 
coastal population of Bangladesh (Caney 2009a, p. 7).
10
  As we saw earlier, there is 
ample evidence in the latest IPCC reports to show that anthropogenic climate change 
is likely to kill, injure, starve and cause illness to many millions of people.  In short, 
anthropogenic climate change will violate their human rights. 
 
So far, I have suggested that it is relatively straightforward to defend the claim that 
anthropogenic climate change violates basic human rights.  We saw earlier that this is 
a significant moral claim with important consequences for how we approach climate 
policy.  Therefore, we should be careful to consider possible objections to the human 
rights approach to climate change.  In the remainder of this paper, I will consider four 
important objections to the claim that anthropogenic climate change violates human 
rights.  I will argue that all of these objections should be rejected.  However, I will 
also suggest that considering these objections helps us to develop a more detailed 
understanding of basic human rights, how they are violated by anthropogenic climate 
change and what role they play in a theory of climate justice. 
 
 
3. Can future persons have human rights? 
 
Many of the effects of climate change will harm future persons, who have not been 
born or even conceived.  However, it has been objected that future persons cannot 
have rights, including human rights, now.  If future persons do not have rights now, 
current persons cannot have correlative duties to respect those (non-existent) rights.  
So, our human rights-based duties in 2009 will only be to persons living in 2009.  In 
2009, we have no human rights-based duties to persons yet to be conceived.   
 
We should begin by noting that this objection may not be as significant as it initially 
appears to be.  We can expect that many people living in 2009 will still be alive in 
2050 and that some people living in 2009 will still be alive in 2100. Therefore, if we 
now have human rights-based duties to everyone living in 2009, we can expect that 
we also have human-rights based duties to many people living in 2050 and even to 
some people living in 2100.  For example, we have a human rights-based duty not to 
do something now that will kill people aged forty-one or over in 2050 or people aged 
ninety-one or over in 2100.  So, we have a human-rights based duty not to cause 
anthropogenic climate change by emitting greenhouse gases today that will produce 
increased storm surges in Bangladesh in 2050, which will kill one or more persons 
aged forty-one or older.  Given that it is likely to be very difficult to take action or 
develop climate policies that selectively protect those aged forty-one or over in 2050, 
the human rights of those already born may also effectively protect the future human 
rights of those yet to be born.   
 
Moreover, the cumulative nature of greenhouse gas emissions may also mean that by 
protecting current persons, some of whom will live for the next hundred years, we 
will also be doing (more or less) all that we would be required to do if the human 
rights of future generations imposed duties on us now.  It is, in large part, an empirical 
question (although, not necessarily one that we can answer with any certainty at this 
time) as to whether (or how far) the actions (or policies) required to protect the future 
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human rights of future persons from anthropogenic climate change overlap with the 
actions (or policies) required to protect the human rights of current persons from 
anthropogenic climate change.  My supposition is that at this point in history a good 
case could be made for considerable (if not complete) overlap.  In other words, any 
current actions that would be required if future persons had human rights now might 
also be required by the human rights of current persons.  However, I will not rely on 
this claim.  Instead, I will argue that we have duties now that are correlative to the 
human rights of future persons. 
 
Those who claim that future persons cannot have human rights now do not deny that 
future persons will have human rights in the future when they become actual people 
(i.e., after they are born).  As Ruth Macklin acknowledges, ‘When these possible 
persons become actual persons, they will have all the rights ordinarily assigned to 
persons’ (1981, p. 152; original emphasis).11  However, these future persons cannot 
have rights now.  Axel Gosseries usefully labels this the ‘right-bearer 
contemporaneity’ requirement: ‘when and only when a person will come into 
existence, she will have rights’ (2008, p. 456; original emphasis).  Rights must be 
contemporaneous with their bearers.  A right cannot exist at time t if the bearer of that 
right does not exist at time t.  Gosseries distinguishes the right-bearer 
contemporaneity requirement from the ‘obligation-right contemporaneity 
requirement’ (2008, p. 456; original emphasis).  The latter is ‘the view that, for an 
obligation to exist, its correlative right would already need to exist’ (Gosseries 2008, 
p. 455).  Rights-based duties must be contemporaneous with the rights that they are 
based on.  A rights-based duty cannot exist at time t if the right that it is based on (or 
correlative to) does not exist at time t.   
 
Gosseries’ distinction suggests that there are two ways of responding to the objection 
that future persons cannot have human rights.  The first response rejects the right-
bearer contemporaneity requirement.  Robert Elliot calls this the ‘Non-concessional 
view’:  ‘future people have rights, albeit contingent rights, in the present, although we 
cannot know who in particular will have these rights unless we know who in 
particular will come into existence’ (Elliot 1989, p. 160).  On this account, our actions 
today can violate the present rights of future people.  The second response accepts the 
right-bearer contemporaneity requirement but rejects the obligation-right 
contemporaneity requirement.  Elliot calls this the ‘Concessional View’: 
 
Clearly present actions and policies will affect the interests of people who 
exist in the future.  And the rights people have in the future will be determined 
by the interests which they have then.  So, it would seem that if we can 
adversely affect their interests, which we can, we can violate their rights.  The 
manifestations of such violations might not occur in the present but the actions 
or policies which cause them do (Elliot 1989, p. 162).   
 
On this account, our actions today can violate the future rights of future people.  I 
propose to defend the Concessional View.
12
   
 
Elliot’s statement of the Concessional View offers a prima facie defence.  If our 
current actions can adversely affect the important interests of future persons, we can 
violate their rights.  I will consider four objections to this argument: (1) the 
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contingency problem; (2) the indeterminacy problem; (3) the temporal order problem; 
and (4) the non-identity problem.   
 
(1) The existence of future persons is contingent; they do not now exist.  Future 
persons are merely ‘possible persons’ (Macklin 1981, p. 151).  How can possible 
persons have human rights?  However, advocates of the rights of future persons point 
out that: 
 
[Our] collective posterity is just as certain to come into existence ‘in the 
normal course of events’ as is any given fetus now in its mother’s womb.  In 
that sense the existence of the distant human future is no more remotely 
potential than that of a particular child already on its way (Feinberg 1981, p. 
147).      
 
Feinberg’s claim is that ‘in the normal course of events’ future persons will certainly 
be born.  Ernest Partridge makes the same point in a slightly different way: ‘future 
generations … are, barring catastrophe, virtually certain’ (1990, p. 53).  Future 
persons are not merely possible persons; they will be actual persons.  The actual 
existence of future persons in the future is contingent only on the absence of 
catastrophe.  It is not contingent in a morally relevant sense.  The existence of 
particular future individuals may be contingent but the existence of some future 
persons is ‘virtually certain’.13  Actual future persons will have human rights in the 
future and we know now (with ‘virtual certainty’) that there will be some future 
persons therefore there will be some future persons with human rights.  
 
(2) We may know that there will be future persons but we do not know the identity of 
those persons:  
 
The real difficulty is not that we doubt whether our descendants will ever be 
actual, but rather that we don’t know who they will be.  It is not their temporal 
remoteness that troubles us so much as their indeterminacy – their present 
faceless and namelessness (Feinberg 1981, pp. 147-8). 
 
We do not know who will exist in the future.  The class of future persons ‘does not 
have any identifiable members’ (Macklin 1981, p. 152).  It is, however, unclear why 
this should be an obstacle to future persons having human rights in the future.  As 
Partridge points out, ‘we need not look to posterity to find examples of duties to, or 
rights of, “unidentifiable persons”’ (Partridge 1990, p. 56).  Feinberg offers an 
example: 
 
We can tell, sometimes, that shadowy forms in the spatial distance belong to 
human beings, though we know not who or how many they are; and this 
imposes a duty on us not to throw bombs, for example, in their direction.  In 
like manner, the vagueness of the human future does not weaken its claim on 
us in light of the nearly certain knowledge that it will, after all, be human 
(Feinberg 1981, p. 148). 
 
The human rights of unidentifiable individuals impose duties on us.  We do not need 
to know the particular identity of a person before we know that they have human 
rights.  Instead, human rights are grounded in our humanity: 
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We attribute general and universal rights to people for what they are: human 
beings, and not with an eye to the question of which particular human beings 
they are, or to when and where they live (Meyer 2003, p. 146).
14
 
 
Human rights are grounded in the interests that we have qua humans.  Therefore, we 
know that future persons will have (more or less) the same human rights as current 
persons.  The indeterminacy of the identity of future persons does not offer any 
grounds for denying that they will have human rights. 
  
(3) If future persons only have human rights in the future, how can current 
generations have current duties not to violate those rights?  Prima facie there is 
something paradoxical about the suggestion that there can be a current duty that is 
grounded in a right that does not yet exist.  However, consider the following scenario: 
 
Imagine that I booby-trap a time capsule such that whoever opens it will be 
greviously injured.  Someone does open it, in fact someone who is not yet 
born.  What I do now is plausibly a violation of a right of that person, albeit 
not of one presently existing (Elliot 1989, p. 162).
15
   
 
Elliot is surely right that we intuitively recognise that the actions of the booby-trapper 
violate the human rights of his victim.  The temporal distance between the action and 
the injury is not morally significant.
16
  If the booby-trapper, B, set the bomb at time t 
and his victim, V, were alive at time t, we would have no doubt that the action 
violated V’s rights even if the booby-trap were not set off and V was not injured until 
t+80 years.  Yet, V will only have the right not to be injured in t+80 years if V is still 
alive in t+80 years.  We don’t attribute rights not to be injured to those who are 
already dead.  We cannot simply assume that if V has human rights at t, then V will 
have human rights at t+80.  Indeed, V’s human rights at t+80 are not dependent on 
V’s existence at t but rather they are dependent on V’s existence at t+80.  This 
suggests that there is no morally relevant difference between this case and Elliot’s 
case where the victim, V1, is not born at time t but is injured at t+80 years (or t+500 
years) by B’s actions at t.  In both cases, B’s actions at t violate the future human 
rights of a person living in the future (it just so happens that in one of the cases the 
victim was also alive – and had human rights – at t).  The status of the human right 
that grounds B’s duty is the same in both cases.17   
 
Therefore, the prima facie paradox of current duties grounded in future rights is not 
specific to the rights of persons not yet born.  Indeed, insofar as the effects of all 
actions necessarily occur after the action, the ‘problem’ is quite general: all human 
rights-based duties are current duties grounded in the future rights of persons living in 
the future (even if it is the very near or immediate future).  We are duty-bound not to 
act so that a person living in the future will have one of their human rights violated as 
a consequence of our actions.  There is no paradox.  Duties come temporally before 
human rights because actions come temporally before their effects.  Human rights 
come normatively ‘before’ (i.e., they justify) duties because effects on human 
interests come normatively ‘before’ (i.e., they justify) restrictions on actions that 
cause those effects.  The relationship between human rights-based duties and the 
rights on which they are based reflects the relationship between normativity and 
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temporality.  There is no special temporal order problem for the future rights of future 
persons.   
 
We can summarise the argument so far.  It is generally accepted that future persons 
will have human rights.  We have seen that the existence of future persons is ‘virtually 
certain’, therefore, there will be some future persons with human rights.  We do not 
need to know the particular identities of future persons to know that they have human 
rights because human rights are rights that persons have qua humans.  There is 
nothing paradoxical about future human rights imposing current duties.  Instead, this 
reflects the relationship between normativity and temporality: effects on important 
human interests (human rights) justify restrictions on actions that cause those effects.  
Duties relate to causes; rights relate to their effects.   
 
(4) The non-identity problem suggests that it is impossible for current generations to 
harm – or adversely affect – the interests of most future generations.  If we cannot 
adversely affect the interests of future generations and human rights protect interests, 
it seems that we cannot violate the rights of future generations.  How can it be that 
continuing to emit greenhouse gases that cause anthropogenic climate change does 
not adversely affect the interests of future generations?  The answer lies in one 
peculiar feature of our relationship to future generations: ‘We can affect their identity’ 
(Parfit 1987, p. 357).  John Broome explains how this is likely to occur in the context 
of climate policy: 
 
Compare what will happen if we take steps to control our pollution of the 
atmosphere with what will happen if we do not.  The steps we shall have to 
take will make a significant difference to people’s lives.  In the rich countries, 
for instance, people will almost certainly have to travel about less.  
Consequently, young people will form different groups of friends, meet 
different people, and marry different people.  They will have children at 
different times, and those will, of course, be different children.  After a 
century or so, nearly all of the people then living will be different individuals 
from the people who will be living if we continue to pollute in our present 
profligate way (Broome 1992, pp. 33-4). 
 
Any significant policy change will affect behaviour and will, consequently, affect the 
identity of future persons.
18
  Different people will exist 150 years from now if we 
pursue a ‘business-as-usual’ policy than would have existed if we had pursued an 
‘emissions reduction’ policy.  Therefore, the victims of anthropogenic climate change 
in 150 years time would not have existed if we had pursued an emissions reduction 
policy.  In other words, they cannot exist without being victims of anthropogenic 
climate change.  This poses a moral challenge: 
 
We should ask, ‘If people live lives that are worth living, even though they are 
killed by some catastrophe, is this worse for these people than if they had 
never existed?’  Our answer must be No.  Though it causes a predictable 
catastrophe, our choice of [business-as-usual] will be worse for no one (Parfit 
1987, p. 372).
19
 
 
10 
We don’t make anyone worse off than they would have been by adopting a business-
as-usual policy because anyone who suffers the effects of anthropogenic climate 
change would never have existed if we had adopted an emissions reduction policy. 
 
The non-identity problem does not undermine the claim that future generations will 
have human rights or that those rights impose duties on us now.  However, it does 
have some implications for how we conceive of those rights and duties.  The non-
identity problem depends on a ‘counterfactual notion of harm’: 
 
Whenever we rely on a concept of harm, we compare the current condition of 
a given person … with her condition as it would have arisen in the absence of 
the allegedly harmful action … Whenever the former condition is worse than 
the latter, the person has been harmed (Gosseries 2008, p. 459). 
 
If an action makes a person’s situation worse than it otherwise would have been, it has 
harmed that person.  The non-identity problem arises because without the action at t 
that causes the victim’s death at t+150, the victim would never have existed. 
Therefore, the action cannot have made her situation worse than it otherwise would 
have been.  Human rights violations are normally harms in the counterfactual sense of 
harm.  For example, if you violate my human right to physical security, you will 
typically make me worse off than I otherwise would have been.  However, human 
rights violations can also be understood – and should more fundamentally be 
understood as – harms in a second sense of that term.  On the threshold notion of 
harm: 
 
Having acted in a certain way (or having refrained from acting in that way) at 
a time t1, we thereby harm someone only if we cause this person’s life to fall 
below some special threshold (Meyer 2003, p. 147).
20
 
 
Human rights protect special thresholds.  An action violates a human right when it 
causes someone to fall below that threshold.  For example, an action violates the 
human right to physical security when it compromises a person’s physical security – 
i.e., when it causes them to fall below the threshold of physical security.  So, actions 
now can (in this sense) harm future persons by violating their human rights (i.e., 
causing them to fall below the thresholds protected by those rights).  For example, 
emitting greenhouse gases that cause anthropogenic climate change, which produces 
storm surges, can violate future persons’ human rights to physical security by causing 
them to be injured.  The action causes the victim to fall below the threshold of 
physical security protected by the human right to physical security.  Once again, we 
can see that the duty not to violate human rights does not depend on the identity of the 
rights-bearer.  Current persons have a duty not to undertake actions that will violate 
the rights of the actual future persons who will exist – even if those particular future 
persons would not have existed but for those very actions.
21
  
 
In this section, I have defended the Concessional View: current persons have current 
duties that are grounded in the human rights that actual future persons will have in the 
future.  This supports our claim that anthropogenic climate change can violate the 
human rights of future generations.   
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4. Risk and human rights. 
 
On the ‘paradigm conception of a human right violation … the negative duties 
imposed by human rights are taken to be specific, clear-cut prohibitions on certain 
kinds of actions (duties not to kill, assault, and so on)’ (Ashford 2007, p. 191).  
Emitting greenhouse gases does not seem to be the kind of action that fits this 
paradigm.  In this section and the next section, I consider two ways in which emitting 
greenhouse gases does not fit this paradigm: our actions only increase the risk of 
harm; our actions only have harmful effects in combination with the actions of others.  
We might call these the ‘risk problem’ and the ‘collective causation problem’.  I will 
argue that a plausible conception of human rights and their correlative duties should 
not be troubled by these problems.  
 
The IPCC reports that there is ‘high confidence’, which it defines as ‘= 8 out of 10 
chance’ (2007a, p. 27), that: 
 
The health status of millions of people is projected to be affected through, for 
example, increases in malnutrition; increased deaths, diseases and injury due 
to extreme weather events; increased burden of diarrhoeal diseases; … and the 
altered spatial distribution of some infectious diseases (IPCC 2007a, p. 48). 
 
The IPCC has less ‘confidence’ about – or attributes a lower probability to – many of 
the more specific and longer-term effects of climate change.  Therefore, we cannot 
say that emitting greenhouse gases violates the human rights to life, physical security, 
subsistence and health.  The most we can say is that emitting greenhouse gases 
increases the risk (or probability) that the human rights to life, physical security, 
subsistence and health will be violated.
22
  This suggests that we need to weaken our 
original claim that anthropogenic climate change violates human rights.  Instead, we 
should claim that anthropogenic climate change increases the risk that human rights 
will be violated. 
 
I think this objection depends on an overly narrow understanding of human rights and 
the duties that are grounded in them.  Shue suggests that a basic human right provides: 
 
(1) the rational basis for a justified demand (2) that the actual enjoyment of a 
substance be (3) socially guaranteed against standard threats (Shue 1980, p. 
13). 
 
It is the third element of Shue’s account that is of interest to us.  Shue emphasizes that 
human rights provide a social guarantee against standard threats.  We can examine 
these two ideas – social guarantee and standard threats – separately.  On Shue’s 
account, it is ‘not enough that at the moment it happens that no one is violating the 
right’ (Shue 1980, p. 16).  The correlative duty to a human right is not merely a duty 
not to (personally) violate that right.   Instead, human rights generate a more complex 
set of duties, which includes the duty not to personally violate that right, but also 
includes ‘a duty to create, if they do not exist, or, if they do, to preserve effective 
institutions for the enjoyment of what people have rights to enjoy’ (Shue 1980, p. 
17).
23
  On this account of a human right, the duty to promote institutions that 
effectively protect that human right is grounded in the right itself.  If human rights are 
grounded in important human interests, the correlative duties must protect those 
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interests.  In a world where there is the possibility (or even the likelihood) of non-
compliance with the duty not to personally violate human rights the correlative duties 
must include the duty to promote and preserve effective institutions ‘that ensure that 
persons can enjoy their human rights’ (Caney 2007, p. 287).  If we did not have this 
duty to promote institutions that provide a social guarantee of human rights, then 
human rights would not adequately serve their function of protecting human interests. 
 
However, Shue makes it clear that the social guarantee of human rights is not against 
all violations but rather against ‘standard threats’: 
 
[If] people are to be provided with a right, their enjoyment of the substance of 
the right must be protected against the typical major threats.  If people are as 
helpless against ordinary threats as they would be on their own, duties 
correlative to a right are not being performed.  Precisely what those threats 
are, and which it is feasible to counter, are of course largely empirical 
questions, and the answers to both questions will change as the situation 
changes (Shue 1980, pp. 32-3). 
 
Shue’s point is that it is not feasible to protect human rights against all threats.  As he 
puts it, ‘this protection need neither be ironclad nor include the prevention of every 
imaginable threat’ (Shue 1980, p. 33).  Instead, we should protect human rights 
against ‘predictable remediable threats’ (Shue 1980, p. 33).  I want to suggest that it is 
plausible to think of anthropogenic climate change as a ‘predictable remediable 
threat’.  It has been predicted by the IPCC that climate change threatens the human 
rights to life, physical security, subsistence and health.  Moreover, the IPCC is 
confident that we can (at least, in part) remedy the threat posed by climate change 
(thereby protecting the human rights of many people) by reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.  So, basic human rights ground a duty to promote effective institutions that 
protect current and future persons from the predictable remediable threat of climate 
change. 
 
I have argued that a plausible conception of human rights includes the correlative duty 
to promote effective institutions for the protection of human rights against predictable 
remediable threats.  I have suggested that anthropogenic climate change is a 
predictable remediable threat.  Therefore, the basic human rights to life, physical 
security, subsistence and health, which are threatened or put at risk by anthropogenic 
climate change, ground a duty to promote effective institutions that reduce or 
eliminate that threat.  The character of this duty is important.  It is not a duty not to 
personally violate basic human rights by emitting greenhouse gases.  Instead, it is a 
duty to promote effective institutions for the protection of basic human rights against 
the threat posed by greenhouse gas emissions.  Anthropogenic climate change violates 
human rights because it is the consequence of our collective failure to fulfil our duty 
to promote effective institutions for controlling greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
 
5. Collective causation, unspecified duties and human rights. 
 
Emitting greenhouse gases does not fit the paradigm of a human right violation in a 
second respect: one person’s actions only have harmful effects in combination with 
the actions of others.  As Margaret Moore has suggested: 
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[Even] if I drive a large SUV, which is far beyond what I need to get to work 
every day, the pollution generated, by itself, doesn’t cause global warming.  
The carbons emitted by me do not cause any harm, by themselves.  The 
problem arises not because of my actions, but because millions of people like 
me, live a lifestyle that involves greenhouse gas emissions, and it is our 
uncoordinated individual action[s], which, together, cause harm to the 
environment (Moore 2008, p. 504). 
 
The harms of climate change are ‘additive harms’ or ‘accumulative harms’ (Ashford 
2007, p. 195; Feinberg 1984a, p. 225).  They are the consequence of the cumulative 
actions of many agents.  One person’s actions would not be enough to cause climate 
change and, therefore, would not cause the harms of climate change.  Indeed, each 
person might reasonably argue that their actions make no significant difference to 
whether (or how many) people are harmed by climate change.
24
  This suggests that no 
one who emits greenhouse gases violates the human rights of the victims of 
anthropogenic climate change.  
 
The problem of additive harms – or collective causation – might be understood as a 
particular version of a more general criticism of human rights-based theories.  Onora 
O’Neill has argued that the problem with rights-based theories is that they do not tell 
us who has the duty to protect rights.
25
  O’Neill’s particular target is positive rights, 
such as rights to welfare or education, because she assumes that we can specify the 
duties that are correlative to negative rights, such as the right not to be killed or 
injured.  However, O’Neill’s concern about unspecified duties extends to negative 
rights when those rights can be violated by the cumulative actions and collective 
practices – working through complex causal chains – of many millions of people.26  In 
the context of anthropogenic climate change, a human rights-based theory does not 
seem to tell us what we most need to know: Who has a duty to do what?  When do a 
person’s greenhouse gas emissions – or other actions – violate the human rights of 
victims of anthropogenic climate change? 
 
I want to consider four responses to this problem.  The first response is the most 
modest.  The first response suggests that: 
 
[One] may know of the existence of a right and of the reasons for it without 
knowing who is bound by duties based on it or what precisely are these duties 
(Raz 1986, p. 184).   
 
Raz suggests that we do not need to be able to specify the correlative duties to defend 
a rights claim.  We can recognise that there are basic human rights to life, physical 
security, subsistence and health and that they are violated by anthropogenic climate 
change without being able to specify the climate-related duties based on those rights.  
Raz acknowledges that without ‘principles of responsibility’ our ‘knowledge of the 
precise content of the right … is incomplete’ but he argues that this ‘merely means 
that [we do] not know all the implications of the right … It does not mean that [we 
do] not understand that [right]’ (Raz 1986, p. 185).  An account of human rights can 
still play an important part in a theory of justice even if it needs to be supplemented 
by ‘principles of responsibility’ (or an account of duties).   
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The second response strengthens the first response by pointing out that rights have a 
‘dynamic character’ (Raz 1986, p. 185).  The basic human rights that are threatened 
by anthropogenic climate change are not new human rights that have only come into 
existence with climate change.  They are basic human rights that can be violated in 
many different ways.  Anthropogenic climate change is a new threat – or a new way 
of violating – those rights.  Therefore, the original formulation of the basic human 
rights could not plausibly have identified climate-related duties.  This is a case where 
changes in ‘circumstances which were not predicted … give rise to a new duty which 
was not predicted in advance’ (Raz 1986, p. 185).  The duties that are correlative to 
basic human rights will change over time because the ‘typical major threats’ will 
change over time (Shue 1980, p. 33).  Anthropogenic climate change is a new way of 
violating basic human rights, which gives rise to new (yet to be specified) duties.  
This is a normal result of the dynamic character of basic human rights. 
 
The first two responses both suggest that we should not reject a human rights-based 
approach to climate change because it does not appear to provide us with a fully 
specified account of the correlative duties.  The third and fourth responses are more 
ambitious.  The third response suggests that we can identify a correlative duty – 
namely, the duty to promote and maintain effective institutions that will ‘specify and 
allocate’ the more specific duties needed to ensure the protection of basic human 
rights (Ashford 2007, p. 217).  This general duty is a slightly more detailed 
specification of the duty to promote effective institutions for the protection of basic 
human rights, which was suggested in the previous section.  Interestingly, the 
justification for it is also slightly different.  In the last section, I argued that if (P1) we 
take human rights seriously and (P2) we expect some people not to comply with the 
duty not to personally violate human rights, then (C1) we should recognise a duty to 
promote effective institutions for the protection of human rights.  The argument in this 
section does not depend on the likelihood of non-compliance.  Instead, the argument 
is that if (P1) we take human rights seriously and (P3) we do not have clear and 
widely acknowledged criteria for specifying and allocating correlative duties, then 
(C2) we should recognise a duty to promote and maintain effective institutions that 
will specify and allocate the duties needed to ensure the protection of human rights.  
(C1) is intended to solve a problem of non-compliance; (C2) is (primarily) intended to 
solve a problem of allocation. 
 
So far, I have suggested that everyone has a duty to promote and maintain effective 
institutions that will specify and allocate the more detailed duties needed to ensure the 
protection of basic human rights from the effects of anthropogenic climate change.  
Let us call this the ‘general duty’.  Of course, there is more work to be done in 
determining what the general duty requires from any particular individual given their 
particular circumstances.  It is, for example, plausible that the general duty requires 
different actions from President Obama than it does from the average US citizen.  
Similarly, it might require different actions from the average UK citizen than it does 
from a person living on less than a $1 per day in a developing nation.  The 
determination of the implications of the general duty for particular individuals at 
particular times is itself a matter of justice, which requires the fair allocation of 
responsibilities.  However, our inability to fully determine the implications of the 
general duty without further work does not provide any reason for doubting that we 
have the duty. 
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The fourth response to the problem of unspecified duties suggests that we can and 
must go beyond the general duty.  The general duty assumes that the specification and 
allocation of more specific duties must be done by effective institutions that aim to 
protect basic human rights from the effects of anthropogenic climate change.  This 
suggests that we have no specific duties – for example, to limit our individual 
greenhouse gas emissions – until there is ‘an actual [and “authoritative”] allocative 
scheme, operative and in force’ (Feinberg 1984b, p. 30).  This is morally problematic 
because it suggests that we can continue with ‘business-as-usual’ greenhouse gas 
emissions until there are effective institutional regulations in place that specify the 
level at which we are required to limit our emissions.  This creates a perverse 
incentive for continuing non-compliance with the general duty: if we don’t comply 
with the general duty and effective institutions are not created, we do not violate any 
human rights-based duties by continuing to emit high levels of greenhouse gases.  If 
we want to avoid this problem, we need to go beyond the general duty. 
 
I want to suggest two further duties that take us beyond the general duty.  I will argue 
that both duties follow from the general duty.  First, we have a duty to rectify the 
wrong that we have done if we fail to comply with the general duty.  On our account, 
if a person does not comply with the general duty, he violates the correlative human 
rights.  We generally recognise that if a person violates another person’s human 
rights, they have a duty to rectify the wrong that they have done.
27
  What does 
rectification require in the context of the general duty?  Let us assume that 
rectification cannot take place until effective institutions are in place and duties are 
specified and allocated.  I would suggest that rectification requires that those who 
have not complied with the general duty should be allocated more burdensome duties, 
including, for example, lower limits on their future greenhouse gas emissions and a 
greater share of the monetary costs of adaptation measures.  The minimum 
requirement should be that they are not advantaged over the course of their lifetime by 
their failure to comply with the general duty.  Moreover, non-compliers might 
legitimately be required to accept a worse outcome if rectification (or compensation) 
of the situation of the victims of human rights violations caused by anthropogenic 
climate change, who might have been protected but for non-compliance with the 
general duty, requires it.  In sum, the general duty implies a duty of rectification: 
under effective institutions, previous non-compliers must accept more burdensome 
duties that may make them worse off than they would have been if they had always 
complied with the general duty. 
 
The second duty that follows from the general duty is the duty not to accept benefits 
that result from actions that violate someone’s human right.  If there were full 
compliance with the general duty, we might plausibly assume that effective 
institutions for specifying and allocating duties to protect basic human rights from 
anthropogenic climate change would quickly be implemented.  Let us assume that 
some people comply with the general duty but others do not and as a result effective 
institutions are not implemented.  Some of the compliers may benefit from the 
delayed implementation of effective institutions if, for example, they have been 
enjoying a lifestyle dependent upon a higher level of emissions than they would have 
been permitted under effective institutions.  We might reasonably say that they are 
benefiting from the actions of the non-compliers.  In other words, they are benefiting 
from actions that violate human rights.  It is, however, surely wrong for someone who 
takes human rights seriously to accept benefits that result from human rights 
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violations.  Therefore, I would suggest that the general duty also implies a duty not to 
accept benefits that result from the failure of other people to comply with the general 
duty.   
 
What does this additional duty require?  I would suggest that it requires each person: 
(1) to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to a level that they can reasonably 
believe would be consistent with the specification and allocation of duties by effective 
institutions; and (2) to accept that effective institutions can legitimately take into 
account the historic emissions (and other relevant actions) of those who have 
complied with the general duty (as well as those who have not complied) during the 
period that effective institutions were delayed by non-compliance.  In other words, the 
duty not to accept benefits requires both individual action now in advance of effective 
institutions and compliance with institutions that (effectively) specify and allocate 
duties ‘retrospectively’.   
 
I have suggested that the problem of collective causation can be understood as a 
particular version of the problem of unspecified duties.  I have offered four responses.  
The first two responses modestly point out that the claim that basic human rights are 
violated by anthropogenic climate change would be significant even if the correlative 
duties were largely unspecified.  The third response was a defence of the general duty 
to promote and maintain effective institutions that will specify and allocate the more 
detailed duties needed to ensure the protection of basic human rights from the effects 
of anthropogenic climate change.  The fourth response derived two further duties 
from the general duty: the duty of rectification; and the duty not to accept benefits 
derived from human rights violations.  I have offered interpretations of these duties 
that place significant demands on individuals before and after the implementation of 
effective institutions. 
 
 
6. Demandingness and human rights. 
 
So far, I have considered three objections to the claim that anthropogenic climate 
change violates human rights: the problem of future generations; the problem of risk; 
and the problem of collective causation and unspecified duties.  In defending the 
claim, I have developed a more detailed conception of human rights and their place in 
a theory of climate justice.  In particular, I have paid attention to the climate-related 
duties that are correlative to basic human rights.  In this section, I want to consider 
one final objection to the claim that anthropogenic climate change violates human 
rights: the problem of demandingness. 
 
Shue suggests that ‘the main task’ in defending a right is ‘to answer the objection that 
the duties involved would ask too much of others’ (Shue 1980, p. 9): 
 
[No] matter how high the positive arguments [for a right] are piled, the critic 
can always respond by conceding it all but simply adding the objection, in 
effect, that recognizing the right in question would place too great a burden on 
all the other people with the duties to honor the right (Shue 1980, pp. 8-9). 
 
In the context of our discussion, the concern is that protecting basic human rights to 
life, physical security, subsistence and health from the effects of anthropogenic 
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climate change would ‘place too great a burden’ on the duty-bearers.  The ‘cost’ of 
protecting human rights from anthropogenic climate change is too high. 
 
It has been suggested that the problem of demandingness is particularly acute when 
the rights of future generations are at stake.  As Shue suggests, the ‘presumably 
indefinitely large number of persons in all future generations will completely swamp 
the numbers in any one current generation’ (1999, p. 49).  This seems likely to lead to 
‘impossible demands on us’ (DeGeorge 1981, p. 161).28  In the context of climate 
change, it has famously been suggested by Bjorn Lomborg (and some economists) 
that the cost of aggressively tackling climate change is too high.  This argument is 
usually based on a cost-benefit analysis, which attributes monetary values to all 
benefits and burdens, including human life, physical security, subsistence and health.  
So, for example, Lomborg claims that ‘Global stabilization of CO2 emissions … 
[would cost] almost twice the cost of global warming itself’ (2001, p. 310).  However, 
Lomborg has also argued that the cost of aggressively tackling climate change is that 
the human rights of current generations in the developing world are not fulfilled.  He 
suggests that the question we must answer is: 
 
Do we want to help more well off inhabitants in the Third World a hundred 
years from now a little [by significantly reducing emissions now] or do we 
want to help poorer inhabitants in the present Third World more?  To give a 
feel for the size of the problem – the Kyoto Protocol will likely cost at least 
$150 billion a year, and possibly much more … UNICEF estimates that just 
$70-80 billion a year could give all Third World inhabitants access to the 
basics like health, education, water and sanitation (Lomborg 2001, p. 322). 
 
So, the cost of protecting the human rights of future generations (which, Lomborg 
believes, may not be seriously threatened anyway) from the effects of anthropogenic 
climate change is that the human rights of current generations remain unfulfilled.   
 
Is protecting basic human rights from the effects of anthropogenic climate change too 
costly?  In part, this is an empirical question.  However, it is ‘not a mere question of 
efficiency to be left to the economists’ (Shue 1980, p. 185, n. 22).  Judgements about 
how much we can ‘afford to pay’ to protect human rights are quite different from the 
economic calculations in an economist’s cost-benefit analysis in two respects.  First, 
we should not assess the opportunity costs of protecting a human right each time we 
might either do or not do something to protect it.  As Shue suggests: 
 
The judgement about whether we can afford to treat something as the content 
of a right … is a prior, stable judgement that is not re-opened every time that 
we must choose between consuming resources in the enforcement of the right 
and consuming the same resources in some other way (Shue 1999, p. 47). 
 
Judgements about the affordability of human rights should remain relatively stable.  
However, we have seen that human rights have a ‘dynamic character’: new threats, 
like anthropogenic climate change, can emerge to ‘old’ human rights, like the rights to 
life, physical security, subsistence and health (Raz 1986, p. 185).  In such cases, it is 
appropriate to consider whether the right should be understood to include protection 
against the new threat.  The cost of including protection against the new threat should 
be a relevant consideration.  Once a judgement has been made to include or exclude 
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the new threat from the substance of the right, it should not be re-opened on every 
occasion when we can choose to act either to protect or not to protect the right. 
 
However, we should also note that the judgement about whether to include the new 
threat does not need to be an all-or-nothing judgement.  We have seen that the 
protection of human rights against standard threats ‘need neither be ironclad nor 
include the prevention of every imaginable threat’ (Shue 1980, p. 33).  We might 
regard anthropogenic climate change as a standard threat to basic human rights but 
accept that protection against it cannot be ‘ironclad’.  In James Nickel’s terms, we 
might ‘prune’ a right by ‘[cutting] back several dimensions of a particular right 
without cutting so deeply or extensively that the right ceases to exist as a meaningful 
norm’ (1987, p. 125).  In such circumstances, we may ‘reduce the level of protection’ 
for the right by, for example, ‘lowering expenditure’ on the institutions that protect it 
(Nickel 1987, p. 126).  If we offer a significant level of protection – for example, we 
significantly reduce the risk of any individual being killed by anthropogenic climate 
change – we might reasonably claim that the right remains a ‘meaningful norm’.  
Analogously, we do not generally believe that the institutions of law and order must 
provide ‘ironclad’ protection against murder for our human right to life to be a 
‘meaningful norm’.  Instead, they need only significantly reduce the risk of any 
individual being intentionally killed by someone else.  This point is important because 
it suggests that anthropogenic climate change might be included as a standard threat 
to basic human rights to life, physical security, subsistence and health without 
providing ‘ironclad’ protection and, therefore, at a lower cost.   
 
The second notable feature of a judgement about the costs of human rights is that 
‘[usually], it is a judgement that cannot be quantitatively calculated’ (Shue 1999, p. 
47).  As Nickel suggests, the opportunity costs of protecting human rights cannot be 
‘adequately represented on a single scale’ because the costs may include not 
protecting (or even violating) other rights or other important moral norms (Nickel 
1987, p. 124; see also pp. 120-1).  We have seen that one of the distinctive features of 
a rights-based approach is that it rejects the (monist) reductionism of economic cost-
benefit-analysis.  Therefore, we cannot expect judgements about the costs of human 
rights to be reducible to economic calculations.  Ultimately, we are making qualitative 
judgements about our moral priorities.  We can, of course, expect them to take into 
account the economic costs – in particular, the implementation costs – of offering a 
particular level of protection of a particular right.  We will, however, only be 
interested in some of the other ways that those resources could be deployed because 
our concern for human rights will take priority over mere preference satisfaction.  As 
Shue suggests, ‘[first], we provide for basic rights; then, preference satisfaction uses 
whatever resources are left’ (1999, p. 47).29  
 
If we accept the priority of basic rights over other considerations and we recognise 
that protection of basic rights can be meaningful without being ‘ironclad’, I think it is 
plausible that the costs of protecting basic rights to life, physical security, subsistence 
and health from the threat of anthropogenic climate change will not be too high.  In 
particular, we can deal with DeGeorge’s concern that recognising the rights of future 
generations will place ‘impossible demands on us’ and we can deal with Lomborg’s 
concern about the basic rights of current generations.  We can recognise and provide 
significant protection for the basic rights of future generations without requiring 
current generations to sacrifice their own basic rights.  As Caney points out, future 
19 
generations only impose unbearable duties on the current generation if we assume that 
there is a duty to ‘maximise preference satisfaction’ (2008, p. 548-9).  Some members 
of the current generation need only give up their ‘orgy of self indulgent consumption 
and unbridled pollution’ to provide a significant level of protection for future 
generations (Shue 1999, p. 49).  The richest 1% of the global population owned 
approximately 40% of global assets ($50 trillion) in 2000.
30
  Each one of the 37 
million people in the richest 1% of the global population had wealth of over $500,000.  
Even if the economic cost of protecting basic human rights from climate change is 
much higher than Lomborg’s estimate of the cost of implementing the Kyoto Protocol 
– say, $750 billion per year – then a 1.5% per annum wealth tax on the richest 1% of 
the global population would more than cover the cost.
31
  It seems extremely unlikely 
that a 1.5% wealth tax would pose a significant threat to the basic rights of someone 
with wealth of over $500,000.  Moreover, it should be clear that Lomborg’s claim that 
we have to choose between protecting the basic rights of the poor in the current 
generation and the (less) poor in future generations is false.  The priority of basic 
rights requires that both sets of demands are met ahead of the preferences of the rich. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Basic human rights are a central feature of liberal political theories.  If anthropogenic 
climate change violates basic human rights, liberals must recognise anthropogenic 
climate change as an injustice.  In this paper, I have defended the claim that 
anthropogenic climate change violates basic human rights to life, physical security, 
subsistence and health.  I have considered four objections: the problem of the rights of 
future generations; the problem of risk; the problem of collective causation and 
unspecified duties; and the problem of demandingness.  In responding to these 
objections, I have defended a distinctive interpretation of human rights and, in 
particular, an account of the climate-related duties that are correlative to the basic 
rights.  Each of us has a general duty to promote effective institutions for the 
specification, allocation and enforcement of more specific duties that will provide a 
significant level of protection for current and future persons’ basic rights from the 
effects of anthropogenic climate change.  In addition, each of us has a duty not to 
accept benefits that result from human rights violations, therefore, each person has a 
duty now not to emit more than they would be allowed to emit under effective 
institutions.  The implications of these duties for particular individuals at particular 
times will be different – and there is much more work to be done to determine our 
relative responsibilities for promoting effective institutions and how more specific 
duties should be specified and allocated by effective institutions.  We can, however, 
safely conclude that the richer and more powerful members of the current generation 
have sufficient resources to fulfil their duties to protect basic human rights from the 
effects of anthropogenic climate change. 
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institutions with us (Pogge 2002, pp. 64-6).  For a good critical discussion of Pogge’s position see 
Caney (2007, pp. 281-6).  Second, on Pogge’s account ‘an isolated incidence of severe domestic 
violence or of parents starving their children could not qualify as a human rights violation.  However, 
many would consider these to be human rights violations, and do not seem to be misusing the term 
“human rights”’ (Ashford 2007, p. 185).  See also Pogge (2002, pp. 65-6). 
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 See Feinberg (1984b, p. 29). 
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 See, for example, O’Neill (1986, pp. 101-3; 1996, pp. 129-35). 
26
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for example, the right not to be tortured: ‘the circumstances under which a right not to be tortured is 
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 See also Dasgupta (2005, p. 7). 
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 The priority of rights over all other goods might not be absolute.  Nickel suggests that the rights 
budget – i.e., ‘the level of overall expenditure on rights’ – should be ‘small enough to (1) avoid putting 
unfair and destructive burdens on particular individuals, (2) avoid undermining the institutions and 
level of economic productivity needed to provide for the general welfare and implement rights 
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(2) and (3) need rather more defence.  My own view is that the priority of human rights over other 
values should not be absolute (so, the rights budget cannot consume the whole budget) but it should be 
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30
 The wealth data in this sentence and the remainder of the paragraph is from Davies et al. (2008). 
31
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